

## **The Role Of Religion In The Political System Of Pakistan**

**Dr. Jamal Shah**

*Associate Professor, Government Post Graduate College, Mardan  
jamalkhattana@gmail.com*

**Zahir Shah**

*Assistant Professor, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan  
zahirshah@awkum.edu.pk*

**Muhammad Saleem Qazi**

*Visiting Lecturer, Pak Studies Department  
Bahauddin Zakriya Universit, Multan  
saleemtaunsvi82@gmail.com*

### **Abstract**

*Pakistan being the outcome of the Freedom Movement of 80 million Muslims of united India will hardly see a minimized role of Islam in its legal, constitutional and political system. Islam has been used as a legitimacy of rule, as a shield for elites' survival, as a tool of state identity, as a weapon of state integrity and has structured the constitutions of the state. However, the religious political parties, except the 2002 general elections, have never effectively shown their presence in the parliament. They have always acted as pressure groups in the making or unmaking of the governments and have strongly supported Zia for financial quid pro quo. Instead religion as a tool of attaining political objectives has been successfully utilized by the non-religious parties. The study highlights the instrumental role of Islam in the constitutional and political history of Pakistan; portrays the track record of the religious parties and their interactions with the military and national political parties. It also highlights Zia's motto behind Islamization process.*

**Key Words:** *Religious Political Parties, Islamization, Zia-ul-Haque, Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal, Ulema and Shariah*

### **1. Introduction**

Islam played a crucial role in Pakistan's creation and is still very vital in the Pakistani politics. The general perception in Pakistan is that its politics is greatly influenced by 3 As (Allah, Army and America). The leaders of Pakistan Movement invoked the religious feelings of the undivided Indian Muslims, which played instrumental role in its strengthening. Though Pakistan's creation was the product of numerous factors e.g. economic, social, cultural, and political, the *raison d'être* of its birth was only Islam. The desire to defend and promote Islamic principles was the only

clarification for a separate independent state. The founding father of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the Quaid-i-Azam) once said, "Our religion, our culture and Islamic ideals are our driving force to achieve independence" (Ahmad, J., 1960: 242). He wanted to set up an Islamic government in Pakistan as he said "I cannot understand a section of the people who deliberately want to create mischief and make propaganda that the constitution of Pakistan will not be made on the basis of *Shariah*...Islam is not only a set of traditions and spiritual doctrines but a code for every Muslim which regulates his life and conduct in politics and economics and the like. Only the *Quranic* injunctions control our behavior in society and politics. In other word, the rule of democracy is indeed the rule of *Shariah* law" (Ahmad, J., 1964: 408). While elaborating the reforms scheme at Sibbi Darbar on February 4, Jinnah said, "In proposing this scheme, I have had one underlying principle in mind, the principle of Islamic democracy. It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for us by our great law-giver, the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). Let us lay the foundation of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles" (1964: 453). Liaquat Ali Khan, during the Objectives Resolution's discussion in the Constituent Assembly in 1949, said that Pakistan came into being because the Indian Muslims desired to lead their lives according to the principles of Islam as it provides solutions to all the problems occurred in the world (Choudhry, 1969: 43).

Though Jinnah devoted all his energy for the justification and feasibility of a sovereign Muslim state within the subcontinent, neither he nor any of his direct circles laid out the blueprint, nature, structure, purpose, functions, powers and limitations of the state they wanted to create for the obvious reason of achieving unity and integrity. This subjected the diverse and desperate people to the vagaries of the period and especially to the machination of those peculiar personalities who dominated the state (Ziring, 2005: 98). Though they appealed to the Islamic ideals in the struggle for Pakistan, they gave no definite picture of an Islamic constitution for Pakistan. The critics say that the forerunners needed only religious sentiments to win mass support but were not desirous of establishing a truly Islamic government in Pakistan. They cite the utterance of Jinnah when he said, "The new state would be a modern, democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal right of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste and creed" (Choudhry, 1969: 45).

Jinnah's speech of August 11, 1947 to the Constituent Assembly also led many people to believe that he was not in favor of establishing the Islamic ideals of the state. Jinnah said "We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are citizens and equal citizens of one state. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state...you will find that in course of time Hindu would cease to be a Hindu and Muslim would cease to be a Muslim, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizen of the state" (Ahmad, J., 1964: 403-04). However, this speech was made at a time when there was complete disturbance and communal fury. Both Hindus and Muslims in

millions suffered from communal violence. Jinnah was emphasizing on communal peace, tranquility, and harmony for the development of the newly born state. The stress was given in his speech to the fact that there would be no distinction between Muslims and Hindus on religious basis but he never held that the ideals of Islam would not be the founding elements in Pakistan's constitution. Thus, Pakistan Movement provided a foundation for the claim of an Islamic state. There was a general consensus that Pakistan would be an Islamic state but it was variously defined and interpreted. Interpretation led to a conflict between the intelligentsia who wanted Islamic principles to be liberally interpreted, and the *ulema* (Islamic scholars), who sought Islamic principles to be literally interpreted to see Pakistan a completely Islamic state.

The demand for Pakistan was a part of the historical movement for self-determination. It was made in the familiar language of nationalism that by any description of a nation we are a nation. Jinnah's struggle was against what he feared to be a permanent enslavement of a hundred million people or their subjection to the status of second class citizens. Jinnah did not want a sort of democracy from which the American Negroes were excluded (Ziring, 2005: 99). For Jinnah nothing was more disgusting than a state ruled by capitalists and landlords with *ulema's* collaboration because they had not played any active role in the Freedom Movement to be justifiable rulers. So the common masses would be the genuine rulers of Pakistan with its government based on the principles of a responsible executive, directly elected legislature, universal adult franchise, and an independent judiciary with judiciable fundamental rights.

The Islamization in Pakistan since 1947 has been maintained more by the secular parties and military than by the religious parties. The military and the mainstream parties have frequently utilized the religious card as an expedient instrument to muster public support for the legitimization of their regimes and policies. Although Jinnah favored a modern democratic country with the *ulema* having restricted power, the elites have mostly manipulated the religious parties and have always used Islam instrumentally for achieving their political objectives.

This study is an endeavor to underscore the role of Islam in Pakistan's political and constitutional structure. The second part of the study concentrates on the dispute over the nature of constitution. It is worth mentioning that both India and Pakistan got independence at the same time (August, 1947). India gave its constitution in 1950 which is still working while Pakistan gave its first constitution in 1956. The delay was mainly due to the conflict over the nature of the constitution. The third part of the paper shows Islam's role in the constitutional polity of Pakistan and highlights how all of the three constitutions of Pakistan made so far are Islamic tilted. The fourth part discusses the dynamics and interactions of the religious parties with the state and the secular parties in Pakistan. It shows the fate of the Islamization process and the religious parties after Zia-ul-Haque regime which pampered them. The fifth part shows how religion has been utilized as a tool for realizing political objectives in Pakistan. The sixth part provides glimpses of religionization of state, politics and society by Zia while the seventh part

concludes the paper.

## 2. Dispute Over the Nature of the Constitution

The influence and utility of the *ulema* in Pakistani politics has been very significant. Pakistan's first constitution was given by the Constituent Assembly in 1956, after a lapse of 9 years where the major cause of delay was the conflict between the *ulema* (religious scholars) and intelligentsia over the status of religion in the new constitution. The *ulema* demanded to establish institutions of the early caliphs, to establish a society that existed in the early days of Islam and thought it as the final interpretation of Islam. They wanted the leaders to look back to the history of Islam and reproduce once again the actual state of affairs set up during the era of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). They did not distinguish the principles and their way of expression. The *ulema* argued that in an Islamic state there is no need of making new laws because Islam being a complete religion contains laws regulating all of the human behavior in a society. Maulana Abdul Hasanat, *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan's* (JUP) president said that our laws are complete and only need interpretation by religious experts. However, some of the *ulema* recognized the need of a legislature for example, Abul Ala Maudoodi, *Jamaat-i-Islami's* (JI) president opined that legislation is possible in Islamic country on matters not covered by *Quran* or the *Sunnah* (Choudhry, 1969: 48).

The *ulema* also stressed that non-Muslim would have a *Dhimmi* status, would not have equal rights with Muslims, and thus would not enjoy full citizenship. According to some of the *ulema*, women should not have right to vote. The *ulema* expressed that putting an extra domestic burden over the women is not permitted in Islam except during sever crisis but with many limitations. The president, according to them, would be a male Muslim. Maudoodi stressed that within 10 years all laws would be made consistent to Islam with a compulsory moral training for all services, central, provincial, civil, and military (Choudhry, 1969: 49-50). They insisted to be granted veto power over legislation thought to be against the teachings of Islam. Reserved seats for women in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures were judged to be un-Islamic. They also argued that Muslim ministers and legislators must be sworn into office by special Islamic oaths. All political figures were obliged to lead exemplary lives, and piety was judged a principle in their right to wield powers. But perhaps the most controversial aspect of the *ulema* role in constitution making was the demand that the *Ahmadi/Quidani* should be declared a religious minority with separate representation and constituencies. Jinnah was much criticized by the orthodox religious organizations for appointing Choudhry Zafarullah Khan, an *Ahmadi*, as a foreign minister and was urged to drop him from the cabinet. This issue worsened the law and order situation in Punjab which was restored only when martial law was proclaimed (Ziring, 2005: 137-43). The picture depicted by the *ulema* shows that they gave too narrow an interpretation of Islamic principles. They thought Islamic principles as dead, unprogressive and static collections.

On the other hand, the intelligentsia was stressing the need of a new 20<sup>th</sup> century and wanted an authoritative and progressive interpretation of Islamic principles. Khawaja

Nazimudin, Governor General of Pakistan, said that Islamic principles have to be interpreted according to the 20<sup>th</sup> century's democratic constitutional practices so that a synthesis of not only the fundamental principles of Islam and the demands of progressive democracy is achieved but also of demands of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and our historical and traditional best elements (Choudhry, 1969: 51). The intelligentsia demanded the power of the progressive interpretation of the Islamic principles to be given to the people's elected representatives and not to the *ulema*. This view was also supported by the prominent Islamic scholars in undivided India including Allama Iqbal who in his Presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930 at Allahabad said that the formation of a Muslim country would save Islam from Arabian imperialism to reshape its culture, education and laws which will bring Islam back to its initial spirit and the demands of contemporary age (Zulfiqar, 1997: 22). Iqbal, in his work "*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*" has emphasized on the progressive and vibrant nature of *Shariah*. He said "In order to meet the new challenges, Islam needed a new *ilm-ul-kalam* (Theological philosophy) and a new *fiqh* (canonical jurisprudence) (Azam, 2002: 300).

There was a third group of Muslim scholars who opined the insufficiency of *Shariah* in contemporary society and whose model was westernized, secular democratic country like Turkey. They were fearful that if an Islamic constitution is formulated, the *mullahs* (religious scholars) would rule the state. They contended that the function of law is to promote the socio-economic development of the nation. Like the *ulema*, they also thought *Shariah* as stagnant and unable of any development and did not thought of dynamic interpretation of Islam (Choudhry, 1969: 55-56).

Against this background, there was a strong emotional demand for the establishment of Islam in the Pakistani community. However, the dilemma cannot be resolved by mere chanting Islamic slogans. The problem with the religious thinkers/leaders is their unclear approach of stressing not on basic issues but on specious details. Generally their views are so indecisive, contradictory and controversial to be taken as useful in the formulation of public policy and have produced more doubts instead of removing them; and their inflexible and rigid attitude has given an excuse to the ruling class not to promulgate the *Shariah*. Since 1947 whenever a religious political movement for the enforcement of *Shariah* has been started, the secular rulers have always tendered excuses for not implementing it because of inconsistent and contradictory views of the religious scholars.

### 3. Islam and the Constitution Making in Pakistan

The religion since the inception of Pakistan has played a very instrumental role. They maintain control over the governmental machinery and compelled the rulers to make Islamic constitutions. The religious elements delayed the constitution for 9 years. The Objectives Resolution (March 12, 1949) was primarily based on Islamic principles. It provided the guiding principles and model for the upcoming constitution of Pakistan. It made an unequivocal recognition of the sovereignty of Allah Almighty alone. The resolution affirmed that the tenets of democracy, social justice, freedom, tolerance and

equality as expressed by Islam should be completely followed. Opportunities should be provided to the Muslims to order their individual and collective lives according to the principles and requirements of Islam as specified in the *Quran* and *Sunnah* with sufficient religio-cultural freedom for minorities (Khan, 2005: 59-62).

The constitution of 1956 named Pakistan as an 'Islamic Republic' with sovereignty resting with Allah. The democratic principles of tolerance, freedom, social justice and equality were provided for. It was compulsory for the president to be Muslim. According to article 23 of the constitution, opportunities should be provided to the Muslims to order their individual and collective lives according to the principles and requirements of Islam as specified in the *Quran* and *Sunnah*. The state was, a) to enable the Muslims to comprehend the meaning of life according to *Quran* and *Sunnah*, b) to enable them to advance unity and observe Islamic ethical principles, c) to establish the proper method of *Waqf* and *Zakat*. According to article 198 no law repugnant to Islam should be enacted and that existing laws should be brought in compliance with Islam. However, it was the parliament which was to declare whether or not a law was against the provisions of Islam. Similarly, the 1962 constitution named Pakistan as Republic but due to the pressure of the religious elements, the first amendment to the constitution was made naming Pakistan as "Islamic Republic". About similar Islamic provisions as of the 1956 constitution were also provided in the 1962 constitution. However, Ayub Khan hesitantly introduced Islamic principles and wanted the political system to be secularized. He promulgated the 'Islamic Marriage and Family Law Ordinance' of 1961, imposed limitations on divorce and polygamy and reinforced the rights of inheritance of minors and women (Shafqat, 1989: 96) which attracted sever criticism from the religious elements.

Nearly all of the previous constitutions' Islamic provisions are contained in the 1973 constitution with the name of the state as "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" (Article 1). It mentions Islam to be the state religion (Article 2). The state is to enable the Muslims to comprehend the meaning of life according to *Quran* and *Sunnah*, (Article 31). The learning of *Quran* and *Islamiyat* (Islamic education) has been made compulsory. Arabic language is encouraged and the correct publishing and printing of the *Quran* is ensured. Likewise, social evils are prevented and *Riba* (interest) is to be eliminated as soon as possible (Article 38/f) with the establishment of proper organization of *zakat* (Islamic tax on money) and *ushr* (Islamic tax on crops) (Article 31/2, c). It is compulsory for the president (article 41/2) and the prime minister (article 91/3) to be Muslims. Article 203 D provides for Federal Shariah Court to decide upon whether a law is in conformity with Islam. Similarly, Council of Islamic Ideology has been established under article 228 to recommend to the legislatures how to bring the individual and collective lives of the Muslims according to the principles and requirements of Islam as specified in the *Quran* and *Sunnah* and to advise the legislature or any house of it and the executive on any question referred to it whether any law or proposal is against the principles of Islam.

The Islamic provisions in the various constitutions show the pivotal role the

religion plays in the Pakistani political system. However, the fact remains that most of the provisions relate to the principles of policy which is a non-judiciable part of the constitution and depend on the availability of the resources.

#### 4. Dynamics of the Religious Parties in Pakistan

Though the *ulema* have been struggling for making Pakistan an Islamic state since 1947, they have not been successful in gaining general support for their objectives. It has been the secular ruling elite who have given Pakistan an Islamic identity for realizing their own political objectives. However, all official efforts for this purpose till 1970s were artificial aiming to legitimize dictatorial regimes and satisfy the *mullahs*. Religious elements in Pakistan began to play a central role since 1970s. *Ulema* have provided a structure through which the country has defined her national objectives/interests and momentum to her domestic and world politics (Naser, 2001: 37). Religion has also improved Pakistan's regional status by opening new possibilities for foreign policies before Islamabad, specifically using Islamic activism for coping with developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Rais, 1994: 45).

The rising religious effects on Pakistani politics are strongly linked with conventional Islamism, as advocated by parties such as *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam* (JUI) and *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI). The JI successfully articulated a sound Islamic ideology and efficiently organized social movement to Islamize the country that would represent and realize the basic tenets of Islam and thus address the political and socio-economic problems. The JI successfully instituted many Islamist presumptions in society and framed key debates in a religious frame of reference. These ultimately diluted the hold of secular politics in Pakistan and contributed first to the fall of Ayub Khan's regime (1958-69) and then to the fall of Z. A. Bhutto's socialism (1971-77) (Nasr, 2004).

When Islamization was started by General Zia, the religious elements started moving to the core stage of Pakistani politics. Zia asserted that he was inspired divinely to Islamize Pakistani with the active co-operation of JI (Gardezi, 2003). Zia politicized the religion by making it a leading principle of state practices which no ruler had ever done since 1947. Zia said that he would seek assistance of the *ulema* in the affairs of the state. The *ulema* were willing to support him and to rationalize Zia's self-motivated interpretation for a financial quid pro quo. State policies received their approval, some of which under different circumstances would have been considered as unislamic. The religious parties glorified Zia as the new *massiah* who had been sent to save and guide the nation to the right path. Zia understood the weakness of the capitalists and religious classes, and was aware of his strength to exploit their temptations to his political advantage. During Zia's regime, both the JI and the military forged an intimate functional relationship with one another. The JI intended to found an Islamic country for which the army's support was vital. On the other hand, the military exploited the Islamist notion of *Jihad*. JI volunteers were trained by ISI (Pakistan intelligence agency) for trans-border activities against the Soviet forces in Afghan (Ahmad, A., 1978).

The formal coalition between the state and the religion ended with Zia's death in 1988. The military and religious parties confronted conflicting interests in the changed political environment. *Ulema*, politicians and military strived to manage state-religion relationship after 1988. The continuous debates, negotiations and confrontation between them altered the nature of Pakistani politics and Islamism. A transition in relation between the state and Islamists started after Zia. The regime which was closely associated with Islamism, and spoke for the rising Islamic identity produced a secular democratic polity led by the secularists, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Consequently, the democratic era after Zia was a period of power struggles between the religious and military forces on the one hand and secular political institutions on the other (Nasr, 1992). The consequences were devastating political cataclysm which eventually destabilized democracy. The democratic forces wanted to give more emphasis on development, welfare and modernization rather than Islamization. The alliance of religious parties and military tried to oppose this development. They viewed Pakistan's foreign policy and interests with Islam and continued stress on Islamization. In the beginning the military trusted the key pro-Zia elements, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and religious parties particularly JI, JUI and JUP which resulted in the creation of an alliance, *Islami Jamhoor Ittehad* (IJI), to oppose the PPP in the 1988 elections. During that time the military thought that IJI would defeat the PPP and hoped that through democratic process IJI would reproduce Zia's Islamization order. The alliance was initially doing well and succeeded to limit the PPP success in 1988 elections. It won the elections to the Punjab Assembly and formed government there. It effectively used the political process to safeguard Islamism and making it difficult for the PPP to govern effectively.

The democratic era provided new opportunities to the PML-N and religious forces. Both the political forces now started to find a chance to control Pakistani politics not perceivable in the 1980s. It was first comprehend by PML-N and distanced itself from the military. Consequently, the process which had brought the party to government in 1990 toppled it in 1993 (Rais, 1997: 53-70). JI also made the same comprehension during 1990-92 and distanced itself from the PML-N. It helped military to topple PML-N government in 1992. Moreover, JI contested the 1993 election on its own and posed an alternative to both PML-N and PPP (Amin, 1994). The Military-JI-PML alliance was now reduced to the military-JI who had a close strategic relationship in Kashmir and Afghanistan, where recruiting and other *Jihadi* activities were organized by the JI (Nasr, 2004).

The situation started to change after 1993. The result of the 1993 elections showed that PML-N (a strong right-of-center party) had the sympathy of the Islamic vote bank. The results rendered the Islamic parties as immaterial. This was the first time that the democratic process had stopped Islamism in the Muslim world (Nasr, 2004). The military was shocked by the results which hoped that JI would reduce the PML-N electoral triumph. The situation resulted in an Islamist-Military coalition with a slight

importance in the political setup dominated by the PML-N which pretended to take control of Islamism from military. Hikmatyar's failure to control Kabul after Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan also annoyed the military. Thus the military saw JI as inadequate in controlling either the local or regional issues. The religious forces were now thought as a depleted power. The military started to find the alternative which came with the emergence of *Taliban* in 1994 (Nasr, 2004) who introduced a new radical Islamist power in Pakistan. Pakistan's military now turned to the *Taliban* to strengthen itself in Pakistani politics and civil war in Afghanistan. *Taliban*'s empowerment meant empowering those who shared its ideology, and helped them with resources and recruits. The military believed that as *Taliban* succeeded in Afghanistan, extremism would fulfill the military's aim of controlling internal politics more effectively.

PML-N while distancing itself from the religious parties got an absolute majority in the 1997 elections with a smallest representation of Islamists in the National Assembly. The results allowed Nawaz Sharif to control Pakistani politics by defining and creating a sound relation between the state and Islam, the first since Zia's period. Nawaz converted his party into a new democratic party devoted not only to the progress of Pakistan but also the promoter of Islamization. The PML-N established a stable right-of-center government which also represented national popular religious aspirations (Gardezi, 2003). Nawaz Sharif modeled his party after 'Malaysia's United Malays National Organization' which had effectively co-opted Islamic elements in 1980 and had advocated both capitalist development and Islamization. As Mushahid Hussain, PML-N leader, said that Nawaz would be both Necmetin Erbakan, leader of Turkish Islamist Refah Party and Malaysian Mahathir Muhammad of Pakistan (Nasr, 2004) because PML-N had won most of the Islamists' seats and had defeated them in the election.

The military under General Musharraf, while fearing Nawaz, turned to radical elements to challenge Nawaz government. Sectarian violence grew in Pakistan throughout 1998-99 with rising militancy in Kashmir. The military tried to weaken the relation between the PML-N and its constituency by promoting growing radicalism of the Islamist discourse by supporting the radical elements. It so radicalized Islamism that a functional center-right alliance was not possible. It also used radical elements in Kashmir to demoralize Nawaz, particularly in the case of Kargil in 1999, when an attack by radical forces into Indian-held Kashmir brought India and Pakistan to the verge of war, and ultimately destabilized Nawaz government.

With Nawaz's overthrow on October 12, 1999 in a coup, the military dictator, Pervaiz Musharraf, began to consolidate his power through an engineered referendum by empowering the military, pacifying religious parties and *Jihadists*, marginalizing national political parties and designing a number of contentious amendments. Musharraf proved skillful in utilizing radical forces domestically and in Kashmir prior to September 11, 2001 to achieve his objectives.

In the general elections of 2002 the religious parties emerged as a strong political force under the umbrella of Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), formed governments in

two provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan, and made a big show into the parliament by securing 50 seats (Mazari, October 12, 2002). Religious parties had never allied before for electoral purposes. As a combination of six parties, MMA composed of the JI, the *Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith* (JAH-S), JUI-F, JUI-S, JUP (N), and the *Tehrik-i-Jaferia Pakistan* (TJP), and came out as a political substitute to the PPP and PML-N. In the past elections no religious party or their alliance had gained more than ten seats in the parliament and hence, the emergence of MMA is believed to have marked a milestone in Pakistani politics with a much toothless performance of the main parties such as PPP and PML (N).

##### 5. Instrumental Use of Islam in Pakistan

All India Muslim League utilized Islam as a political instrument during the freedom movement to unite the Muslims against the Indian National Congress. Even the most secular of Pakistani leaders could not avoid their commitment to the holy doctrine. That is why both the first and second Constituent Assemblies struggled with secular and religious approaches and found a synthesis between modernity and tradition the preferable course of action and reference was made to Jinnah's expressions that Pakistan was to be a democratic country, guided by Islamic doctrine. Iskander Mirza, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Governor General of Pakistan, was an advocate of the separation of state and religion. He had been quoted as saying "we cannot run wild on Islam, it is Pakistan first and last" (Choudhry, 1969: 45). But even he was concerned that an undue emphasis on religious exclusivity would divide the state more than unify it. Choudhry Muhammad Ali, Pakistan's ex. prime minister, articulated the thought of the framers when he delicately balanced secular need with religious commitment (Choudhry, 1969: 45).

Ayub Khan (Ex. President of Pakistan) did not use Islam to justify his declaration of martial law which, according to him, had become essential to maintain law and order and eradicate inefficiency, malpractices, intrigue and corruption. In the beginning Ayub Khan did not endorse the title "Islamic" to the name of Pakistan in 1962 constitution but reinstated it in 1963 due to the *ulema's* pressure. The *ulema* extensively opposed Ayub Khan's secular democratic image and anti-Ayub demonstrations swept across Pakistan by the late 1960s. The mainstream parties cooperated with the religious parties, who exploited the anti-Islamic policies of Ayub Khan and played a vital role in his fall (Ahmad, M., 1993: 5). The establishment of the Central Institute of Islamic Research was Ayub's answer to his Islamic critics (Ziring, 2005: 243).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's regime was a period of ineffectiveness and disappointment for the religious parties. While too weak inside the National Assembly these parties took to the streets to show their strength. The religious parties united with the secular parties, like Pakistan Democratic Party, *Tehrik-i- Istiqlal*, etc. to beat a common political rival. Bhutto being secular started using Islamic card for his own stability by Islamizing the 1973 constitution where Islam was made state religion (Article 2) and a commitment was made to bring all existing laws in conformity with Islamic principles (Article 227)

(Abbas, 1997: 34). Moreover, Bhutto declared *Ahmadis* as minority due to *ulema*'s pressure which increased religious animosity (Abbas, 1997: 164).

Islamization intensified during Zia's era who after refusing to comply with the verdicts of the Supreme Court in the Begum Nusrat Bhutto case to hold early elections, began to use religious card in his speeches for legitimizing his rule and countering PPP propaganda. Zia and JI along with several other religious leaders forged a working platform after the physical elimination of Bhutto in 1979 which helped Zia controlling the post-Bhutto situation. Islam was institutionalized by establishing *maktabs*, *madaris*, and *darululooms* (Rizvi, 2000: 247).

Zia's regime was a mullah and military alliance which appeared through the JI because of national and international dynamics in the 1980s with a socio-economic and political agenda. The domestic dimensions of this alliance was associated with the appeasement of religious groups for regime stability, retaining power; counteracting the left over reputation of Bhutto's Islamic socialism; legitimizing his power; and practicing a dictatorial system of governance while the external dimensions were linked to Soviet presence in Afghanistan; reinforcement of the country's Islamic identity; acquiring foreign funding from Islamic countries for the promulgation of Islam; and developing stronger military relations with Islamic states (Shah, 2012; Chengappa, 2004: 4). Pakistan promoted *Jihadists* to wage Pakistan's proxy war against the ex-USSR as a war between Islam and "Godless" communism to avoid direct involvement in the confrontation. Consequently, Islamism developed firm roots in the country owing to Zia's policies (Amin, 1982: 130). Zia followed JI's Islamist ideology by mixing politics with religion with the aims of legitimizing his rule and acquiring political partners for prolonging his rule (Chengappa, 2004: 1-2). Pakistani extremist groups were pampered by the military and intelligence agencies whose nexus resulted in the "Islamization" of the country (Chengappa, 2004: 46-7; Jalalzai, 1998: 138). According to Shah (2012), Zia was the first ruler who thought that religion could be the foremost integrating element in a pluralist country and took tangible steps for Islamizing Pakistan. Zia rightly perceived that the awakened desire of the people for better economic living could be satisfied in the context of Islam by a determined campaign by his military regime to build a truly just and fraternal Islamic society. Better relations with the Middle East and the events in Afghanistan and Iran provided Zia more opportunities to stabilize his position (Piscatori, 1989: 195).

Zia's conception of an Islamic state was deeply influenced by the teachings of the JI's founder, Maudoodi. His measures for Islamization in Pakistan were identical to those advocated by Maudoodi for example; a non-party theocratic state with an authoritarian ruler. In 1978 some of the JI leaders were invited by Zia to help him in effectively implementing *Nifaz-i-Islam* which they thought as a golden chance for implementing Islamic system (Rabbani, 2002: 503).

## 6. Zia: Religionization of State, Politics and Society

Zia enforced a wide range of reforms for Islamism, the effects of which in the economy, administration, elections rules, legal system, and other societal spheres are tremendous. Piscatori (1989: 196) says that there are doubts whether Zia was really sincere in formulating an adequate scheme of Islamic change. He had too much concentrated on the punitive aspects with little attempt for popular involvement. Likewise, little were done for implementing an interest free banking system (Weaver, 2002: 79).

The government on April 7, 1979 passed a national education policy banning the setting up of further English medium schools and replaced many of them at primary level by *maktabs* and *madaris*. English schools were directed to adopt Urdu as mode of instruction (Chengappa, 2004: 15). Degree from *madaris* was equalized to that of Pakistani university's Master degree. The *Deobandi* organizations and *madaris* proliferated during Zia regime thus, strengthened his support base (Shah, 2012). *Madaris* were patronized because Zia required dedicated youth to wage the US proxy war against the ex-USSR in Afghanistan which only the students from JI run *Deobandi madaris* could do (Jamal, 2003). JI penetrated the officer corps, the only political party having such opportunities, which provided sufficient shield to its secret cells inside the armed forces (Ahmad, A., 1978).

Steps were taken to Islamize Pakistan's military. The new recruits were particularly less westernized. They were groomed in a more religious environment with more traditional attitudes and values. Friday prayers were regularized at regimental mosques (which in the past was an individual matter) with the status and pay of *maulves* in the services raised (Mukherjee, 1989). A Religious Instruction Directorate was established in the military training institutes to instruct the officers on Islamic ideology. The military leadership also decided in 1979 to change the western dresses at the military messes to the conventional *sherwani*-a long black coat (Cohen, 1992: 97).

Various ordinances were passed for Islamization of society like Hudood Ordinance for punishing theft, robbery, (Kamran, 2008: 121), selling and drinking of alcohol by Muslims, and the Prohibition Order (The Prohibition Order, 1979) many of which were not applicable on non-Muslim. Similarly, under *Zina* Ordinance the guilty (both man and woman) was to be flogged if unmarried or stoned to death, if married (The Offence of *Zina* Ordinance, 1979). The ordinance was highly criticized at implementation level because of injustices to women and attracted harsh international criticism. The first conviction and sentence of stoning to death of Allah Bakhsh and Fehmida under the Ordinance was set aside in 1981 due to domestic and foreign pressure. In a number of cases the females who made allegation of rape were convicted for *Zina* while the rapists were acquitted as in the case of *Safia Bibi*, a 13 year blind girl (Kamran, 2008: 122-23). In a similar vein, the Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and Penal Code (PPC) were amended in 1980, 1982, and 1986 through Ordinances declaring anything causing

disgrace to the Holy Prophet, his family, his *Sahaba* and Islamic symbols a cognizable offence with a punishment of imprisonment, fine or both (Shah, 2012).

The constitution was amended to define who is a Muslim specifying that a person not accepting Muhammad (SAW) as the last prophet will not be a Muslim (Kamran, 2008: 120). Regular performance of prayers was made obligatory in government institutions during duty timings. Suitable arrangements for prayers were made in official functions, railway stations, airport, and bus stops. Likewise, “*Ehtrami-i-Ramzan*” ordinance provided for full inviolability of the holy month of *Ramadhan* including the closing of cinema halls about 3 hours before the *Maghreb* prayers (Kamran, 2008: 125). Likewise, mass media was directed to reflect established Islamic values. Censorship of films was made stricter with various unorthodox cultural activities discouraged (Rizvi, 2000: 247-48). However, several groups in Pakistan argue that the main stress of Islamism was punitive, regulative and extractive with other aspects of Islam ignored for instance, socio-economic equality and accountability of the rulers. Many criticized Islamization as failed in solving major socio-economic and political problems of Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000, 249).

Islam was in the same way institutionalized in the society. Zia pleaded for Pakistan to be an Islamic country. He said that Islamic system had not been implemented at the suitable time that is why the basic needs of the citizen had not been met. He said that the country being created in the name of religion with particular objectives could stay only in the name of religion. We could achieve our objectives only if we practically show our dedication and true love for religion, Islam (Kaushik, 1993: 47). Zia made various efforts for institutionalizing Islam in society like establishing Islamic Ideology Council and *Shariah* Courts (1979) with the power to set aside any law violating the fundamental law of Islam as un-Islamic. The *Shariah* Council was to examine the constitutional and legal matters of the country for bringing them according to Islam (Burks, 1991: 36); Federal *Shariah* Court to investigate the Islamic nature of a law or issue. Any law of the state could be challenged by any citizen in the *Shariah* Court; *Majlis-e-Shoora* (1980) which was almost a debating body, clearly unrepresentative with no legislative powers and acted as a council of advisors to the President (Shahid & Shahid, 2005: 257); establishing various committees, cells, departments in universities, commissions, and other organizations with the functions to study, plan, and employ the Islamic transformation of society. Various conferences on Islam were arranged and mass media was order to give them cover. Extra marks were given to Huffaz in Superior Services (CSS) examination and medical and engineering admissions; establishing *Shariah* Faculty in 1979 at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad which was raised to the status of Islamic university a year later (Rabbani, 2002: 503-04); establishing *Salat* committees at district levels to make people punctual in the performance of their prayers with the government institutions instructed to fix prayers timings during office times (Shah, 2012); establishing *madaris* specifically *Deobandi* JI run *madaris* with the high degree of proliferation (see Hilali, 2002); for Islamizing the economy the Investment Corporation

of Pakistan and National Investment Trust were directed to run on fairness basis rather than interest basis from July 1, 1979. Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) as an interest free banking system was started in January 1981 (Shahid & Shahid, 2005: 258-59); and through *Zakat* and *Ushr* Ordinance (1980) *Zakat* was levied at the rate of 2.5% annually above Rs. 3000/-from bank balance of Muslims while *Ushr* was imposed on the agricultural produces (see Noman, 1990: 154).

Zia utilized Islam not only to hold governmental power but also to tighten his position both domestically and regionally. The Mullah-Military coalition defended the suppression of national democratic forces on the plea of building an Islamic order. Political parties, parliament, federal, unitary, presidential, parliamentary forms of governments and fundamental rights were secular terms which had no role in the Islamic political system providing for indivisible *Amir-al-Momineen*. He thought dictatorship as compatible with Islam provided the dictator was committed to uphold the law of Allah and was Allah-fearing. He said that behind his elevation was a divine hand. It was a mission he had received from Allah, which he had to complete (Ahmad, M., 1993: 12-3). His political system was highly personalized. Feudalism and capitalism were Allah-given systems and property was believed to be worshipped and protected. Addressing the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Karachi, Zia described the land-holding class as the very backbone of society. They were the nominated people of Allah, because of their fulfillment of religious obligations like the dispensation of charity, *Zakat*, and *Hajj*. The mosques and *madaris* received special attention and state patronage (Ahmad, M., 1993: 13-5).

## 7. Conclusion

Islam is extremely instrumental in Pakistani politics. It has been used for legitimizing regimes and national and foreign policies. The status of Islamism in Pakistan since 1947 has been maintained through state power where state elites have played a significant role in proliferating religion and extremism and have applied Islam as an instrument for achieving national and foreign policy objectives. However, the religious card has been more effectively used by the military and political leaders than the *mullahs* which shows the marginalized role the clergy has played in the politics of Pakistan. It helped in regime making, but has never been a strong political force providing directions to the polity.

Islam has always been utilized for political purposes and political persecution as a viable instrument because it is kept dearer by the majority of the Pakistanis with emotional attachment to it—a sensitivity which has remained unchanged. The religion's vital role in the country is because of the fact that political leaders have been unsuccessful to consent on the statecraft and principles of governance. Democracy has been unable to have firm roots in Pakistan and slacken off the hold of feudalism here or spend limited resources in sectors such as health and education. The basic rules of good governance are not followed, applied, adhered to or are differently applied in Pakistan. Furthermore, political parties are considered as personal enterprises; are highly

personalized; lack coherent and functional ideology; and structurally highly undemocratic. The military leaders have usurped civilian power in the name of eliminating corruption and streamlining democracy but have in fact, uprooted democratic principles. Likewise, centralization and personalization of power have resulted into the weakening and demoralizing of alternative state's power centers (executive, civil bureaucracy, legislature, and judiciary), degrading democratic accountability and eroding public confidence on public institutions which are fragile, underdeveloped and incapable to carry out their specific functions. No honest strategy has been devised to make corrupt bureaucrats and politicians accountable. The spirit and inviolability of the constitution and democratic norms are repeatedly violated with the result that Pakistani leaders have manifested highest level of inability for carrying out uninterrupted political process.

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