

## Post-Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Pakistan: A Story of Estrangement and Engagement

**Tahira Nasib**

*PhD Research Scholar International Relations Department,  
University of Peshawar  
[nasibtahira@gmail.com](mailto:nasibtahira@gmail.com)*

**Prof. Dr. Ghulam Mustafa**

*Advisor academics, FATA University*

### ABSTRACT

*Hegemony through expansionism remained the dominant thought of Indian mind since partition. Such thought is the legacy of British colonialism, which made India to strive for regional leadership. Successful nuclear tests of India paved its way to cherish its long awaited dream of undoing Pakistan. But the thought and its power expression stumbled with the nuclear detonation of Pakistan. The counter nuclear explosions of Pakistan turned the desire of Akhand Bharath immaterialized. Pakistan's nuclear capability categorically made it vivid that peace in the region without being peaceful to Pakistan is of no consequence. Pakistan's explosions hushed the belligerent India, who was dreaming of forceful acquisition of Kashmir. To be a hegemon and regional leader, India revisited its bellicose foreign policy towards Pakistan and initiated peace process. The journey of peace that started with Lahore declaration and moved towards Agra Summit and CBMs, faltered when India rejected the involvement of Kashmiri leaders in their fate decision. While following the footprints of Real Politik, India turned its bellicosity into affirmation towards Pakistan but never compromised on strategic issues like Kashmir, Siachin and Sir Creek. India agreed when India decided to agree without considering Pakistan's reservations. But the nuclear deterrence clarified Pakistan's security posture in the region and beyond. The inflexibility and stubbornness in Indian attitude keeps the region prone to conflicts and violence as opposed to peacefulness for trade and development.*

**Key words:** Indo-Pak relations, nuclear capability, post-nuclear policy, Neo-Classical Realism, nuclear deterrence.

### INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is a fundamental instrument for any state that is used for its survival in the international politics. It is a strategy of any government to comprehend futuristic direction of state interaction with the rest of the world. Foreign policy is not only the extension of domestic policy but it also presents the dynamics of a political

system of a state (Hussain, 2011). The state is not the sole actor in the foreign policy formation, but has to accommodate internal and external geo-politico-socio-cultural economic and military dimensions of the international system. Therefore, foreign policy formulation mechanism involves multi-dimensional internal and external variables like culture, economy, geography, demography, ruling elite, security, geo-political and geo-strategic vacuums and the changes in the regional and global balance of power (Bojang, 2018). Since variables of international system are constantly in flux, therefore the certainty of the foreign policy of any state cannot be guaranteed within evolutionary nature of international politics. However, the continuity of change in international and regional affairs dominate the evolutionary nature of the foreign policy of a state which is sometimes termed as geo-strategic policy of a state. This paper highlights the foreign policy of India in the post-nuclear era (1998-2004) with the help of descriptive-analysis through the prism of Neo-Classical Realism.

Though nuclear capability was achieved in May 1998, but the way to reach this point is a history in itself. The history, which not only includes nuclear history but also the history of *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) to reach the national level for its role in Indian politics. Before the emergence of BJP to the national level, every political party and political leader of India based Indian foreign policy on two traits i.e. expansionism and hegemonic trends. Such trends emerged in the idea of Greater India or *Vishal Bharath*. In the words of Pakistan's President Ayub Khan:

*"The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extends from the Hindu Kush Mountain to the Mekong River (Rai, 1981, p. 304)".*

Realizing the basic principle of nation state system operating International politics, a nation state must either expand or expire. Therefore states usually acquire nuclear capability to proliferate nuclear arsenals due to major reasons i.e. security challenges, prestige and power position, technological imperatives and domestic political push and pull factors (Abbas, 2018). To confront the needs of security and survival, a state has no option but to promote nuclear deterrence as a symbol of prestige and power status in International and regional politics. Security concern and power position played vital role in making India a nuclear power. Being faced by Pakistan, the arch rival in the region, India developed nuclear weapons to deter any hostile action. China, too, remained important for India due to security issues. In addition, to have modern, industrialized and prestigious outlook India opted for nuclear capability.

In the regional politics India shares either land border or coastline with six states i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives. Due to such geographical advantage, India has always been exercising hegemonic designs through politico-military dominance over other states. A state is given the status of hegemon if it is a single great power in its region. To become a hegemon is not the dream of India but the legacy of the

British Colonialism. India took partition for granted and dreamed about Greater India, which would be covering present day India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

The essence of Indian security and foreign policies remained the objective of regional leadership through expansionism. Such policy was a part of Nehru's vision of Greater India. Nehru believed that fate has made India to go for big things and make clear difference to the world. The national interests of India in the South Asia initiated to be pursued with the limited use of force by Nehru (Cheema, 2010). India used limited force, immediately after partition, for the forceful accession of Kashmir with India. Such pattern did not end but continues until today. On one side, it kept on fighting for the territory of Kashmir with Pakistan, turning it into a battleground. On the other side, India intentionally delayed the dispatch of defense equipment and military assets to Pakistan, as the only hurdle it faces in the way of hegemony is Pakistan. To declare itself the only great power of the region, India tried every possible effort to contain and subjugate Pakistan by expanding its energies since partition. The political leaders of India kept on subjecting the Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck for a deceitful and underhand interference for the purpose of complete sabotage (Connell, 1959). Indian foreign policy made a beginning with the aim of something more than the containment of Pakistan.

Indian expansionism began with Kashmir in 1947 and led to a series of such moves until 2019 i.e., annexation of Manipur and Tripura in 1949, South Tibet in 1951, Nagar-Aveli and Dadro in 1954, Goa in 1961, Kalapani (Nepal) in 1962, China in 1962, Turtuk (Pakistan) in 1971, Tin Bigha (Bangladesh) in 1972, Sikkim in 1975, aborted attempt of Mauritius invasion in 1983 and Bhutan annexation in 1990, annexation of Duars (Bhutan) in 2006, Moreh (Myanmar) in 2013 and Kashmir, recently, by dissolution of article 370 n 2019. All such hostilities and invasions were carried out to fulfill the dream of Greater India envisioned by India leaders.

Apart from hegemony and expansionism another feature of Indian foreign policy was clearly mentioned by Nehru in his book, *The Discovery of India*. To make India a modern and industrialized country, Nehru had an intention of developing basic and heavy industries for the use and promotion of science and technology. The nuclear option remained Indian priority before partition. The atomic energy program was initiated in 1944, when Canada provided a ton of uranium oxide to India. Later on, such collaboration resulted in the building of Canada-India Reactor (CIR). Heavy water for such reactor was borrowed from US under "Atoms for Peace" program. Entry of US in the Indian atomic energy program changed the name of CIR to CIRUS. The Indo-Canadian agreement about reactor only provided for the peaceful application of energy (Subramanian, 1996). However, India did not respect the letter and spirit of agreement and detonated nuclear device in May 1974.

The hidden nuclear preparations of India and the denial of such preparations by Indian leaders ended with the successful nuclear explosion of May 1974. US opening to Beijing in 1971 and Pakistan's role in such monumental move was the driving force behind

nuclear tests, as India was doubtful of US-China-Pakistan axis. Soon after detonation, Canada halted further collaboration with India for Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant in 1976 while other powers protested. Consequently, India adopted the policy of nuclear ambiguity. In 1978, Indian government under Morarji Desai distanced itself from nuclear technology. Such initiative was in continuation of ambiguity.

In the mid-1980s until 1993, Pakistan proposed India almost seven proposals regarding nuclear restraint and regional disarmament. India rejected all such proposals on the plea that it would discuss nuclear disarmament only in global perspective. The strategy behind this rejection and perspective was to entreat US for putting pressure, through Pressler Amendment, on Pakistan not to make nuclear weapons. In 1995, instead of signing CTBT, which India pioneered, New Delhi conditioned the signature with the nuclear disarmament of P-5 (US, Russia, Japan, China and Germany).

#### **POST NUCLEAR INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN**

Until 1998, BJP remained the only party, which favored the overt nuclearization and made it an important agenda for national security. Such agenda was materialized on May 11<sup>th</sup>, 1998 in the form of Pokharan-II. Pokharan-II was comprised of three nuclear tests on May 11<sup>th</sup> and two more tests on May 13<sup>th</sup>. Such explosions met great condemnations and sanctions from the international community. The journey initiated by Nehru and his team before partition was taken to its apex by BJP in 1998. Nehru wanted a modernized India while having nuclear capability. Whereas BJP leaders wanted India to have a strong *Hindutva*, while possessing nuclear capability.

To BJP Pakistan remained an important neighbour with whom relations occupy strategic relevance. In this regard, India remained doubtful about the military assistance to Pakistan by US, as it was seen a bellicosity towards India. The emergence of BJP in the Indian national leadership not only gave nuclear power declaration to India but also the party tried to normalize relations with the neighbours, which apparently remained the main agenda of BJP. Earlier the poor economic conditions made India unable to overtly conduct nuclear tests. Other than this, weak USSR was in no position to take stand on the behalf of India against US. Since Rao's open market reforms were introduced, India grew economically and the way for being nuclear was seen a bit clear.

Other than economic reason, there were other reasons too which compelled India to achieve nuclear capability;

- The earlier generation of scientists who worked and tested the nuclear capability in 1974 were either retired or getting retired. So to India it was crucial to check where exactly India nuclear programme stood.
- BJP's ideology was based on *Hindutva*, which truly demanded a strong India regionally as well as globally.
- On one side China was a threat to India where as on the other, Pakistan and particularly Kashmir issue needed to be submissive and buried.

- Nuclear capability would give India an edge in dominating the Indian Ocean and beyond.

These explosions were carried out with a belief that Pakistan neither has the wherewithal nor the global environment would allow Pakistan to go for a quid pro quo response. For India, it was a golden opportunity to establish its status as nuclear power, subjugate Pakistan and thus attain the status of regional power (B. Shah, personal communication, July 15, 2019). For most states, regional hegemony is the goal as global hegemony is hard to establish (Herd, 2010). The immediate response of Indian political leadership on nuclear capability achievement revealed categorically that Pakistan never was important for BJP as they signalled in their election campaigns. Rather they started believing that they had an opportunity to materialize their dream of Akhand Bharat, as to them Pakistan was a small state with fragile political system and weak economy and can be finished easily. As L. K. Advani said:

*“Pakistan must learn to live with their gaze low(Suharwardhi, personal communication, June 28, 2019)”.*

Being the arch-rival and close neighbor, Pakistan remained concerned on Indian nuclear tests. These sanctions immediately made India lose aid and other inflows worth \$20.63 billion (Wadhva, 1998). Being faced with the rage and economic sanctions of international community, India launched diplomatic efforts to lessen the severity of rage. As economic sanctions weaken the economy and raise domestic interest rates, therefore Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote letters to the leaders of seven industrialized countries i.e. US, Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Germany as well as to Russia. Indian PM tried to convince the leaders for the inevitability of the nuclear tests by stating that such tests were needed to assure Indian people that their security interests would be protected (India launches diplomatic efforts after tests, 1998). However, the excuse of national security was skillfully utilized to not only cheat the world but to resort to nuclear tests (India fooled its public, cheated world: Chinese paper, 1998). Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes declared that the main reason behind such explosions was China- a serious threat to Indian security.

The nuclear India totally came out of its policy of friendly neighbourhood with Pakistan. Indian leaders adopted a belligerent posture towards Pakistan and talked about forceful resolution of Kashmir issue (Lateef, personal communication, August 01, 2019). It totally altered the Strat Bal in the region. While addressing some 500 Hindu nationalists, Vajpayee clearly stated that his country was a nuclear state and would never feel any hesitation in the use of nuclear bomb against any state

Regional countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives were under pressure from India and Pakistan was losing its influence in the regional issues. India never

expected Pakistan to become nuclear as to India, Pakistan was in no position to bear international sanctions. But Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions on May 28<sup>th</sup>, 1998 with an argument:

*“To re-establish the Strat Bal and to safeguard its security and sovereignty, Pakistan was forced to establish Nuclear Deterrence in self defence(Aslam, personal communication, July 24, 2019)”.*

Pakistan detonated its nuclear device thus bringing strategic balance in the region. Such explosions not only hushed India but made India to revisit its foreign policy. Such tests removed Indian misconception and doubt regarding Pakistan's nuclear capability. Balance of power and nuclear deterrence were initiated in the region and it brought normalcy in Indo-Pak relations. An affirmative turn was observed in the Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. The then BJP leader Vajpayee, in order to restart the peace process, inaugurated a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore. This initiative turned the belligerent face of BJP leaders down and their motive of election campaign i.e. good neighbourly relations triumphed.

But such positiveness did not last for long as after Lahore Declaration, Kargil crisis happened and it renewed the hostile chapter of Indo-Pak relations. It badly affected the initiative of peace process. The Kargil conflict was aimed to make India negotiate for the settlement of Kashmir issue as well as to internationalize the issue for peaceful resolution. In fact Pakistan wanted to take back the Siachin area, which India ceased in operation Maghdood in 1984.

Kargil was such a conflict in which India could easily attack Kashmir border to encircle the infiltrators. But to avoid the risk of nuclear war, India didn't open any other front and kept Kargil war limited. Other than nuclear deterrence, there were political and military reasons to keep Kargil war limited. For instance, politically a full fledged war in Kashmir could have highlighted the unsolved issue of Kashmir and attracted the world attention, which India always tried to avoid. In addition, Kargil is closed to Indian main supply route to Siachin. Therefore India could ill afford a full scale war at that spot, simply because a blockage or disruption of that route would have caused a very serious situation for Indian military in the Siachin.

Along with India, international as well as regional powers were interested in quick and peaceful solution of the dispute as a few statements from the Pakistani side really alarmed the world. On May 31<sup>st</sup>, 1999, Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad stated:

*“Escalation could lead Pakistan to use any weapon in the arsenal(Aslam, personal communication, July 24, 2019)”.*

Another statement he gave in Senate:

*“Purpose of developing weapons become meaningless if they are not used when they are needed(Aslam, personal communication, July 24, 2019)”.*

Such alarming statements made India affirmative as well as cautious regarding matters with Pakistan. India realized that it cannot pressurize Pakistan militarily beyond certain limits. In addition to this, the world also realized that now Pakistan and India should be and must be treated alike as both were nuclear regional rivals.

Post Kargil relations, inevitably, remained strained due to the mistrust between the neighbouring nations along with the increased defence expenditure by India. One of the factors, other than Kargil, that contributed in the tense relations was the military *coup d’etat* on October 12<sup>th</sup>, 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf. Indian government never favoured any talks with the military rulers in Pakistan. Besides, Musharraf was considered as the mastermind of Kargil and India believed that such a person could never be interested in peace formation (Aziz, personal communication, August 10, 2019). These factors really helped in bringing no peaceful solution to any Indo-Pak problem.

Being the military ruler, Musharraf faced the rigid face of India. Musharraf tried to normalize relations and find a viable solution for Kashmir dispute. For this, he gave many concessions to India and allowed India to erect the bar along the line of control. The underlying purpose was to assist India in controlling cross border movement, to tell international community about Pakistan’s sincerity in resolving Kashmir dispute and controlling cross border movement. In addition to this, Pakistan wanted the world to know that Kashmir movement is indigenous and just. Therefore, Musharraf invited Indian leaders to talk and negotiate on Kashmir resolution but till today India never accepted any such move.

India never agreed to solve Kashmir dispute according to the UN resolutions as well as involving third party. India never welcomed Kashmiri leaders in the talks as accepting Kashmiri leaders or any third party would weaken the Indian stance on Kashmir by enforcing the UN resolutions. Also it would accept the individualistic identity of Kashmir. India not only kept on rejecting Pakistan’s endeavours for peace but also tried its level best to harm Pakistan’s influence internationally. In this regard India opposed Pakistan’s entry in IORA. IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) is an international organization consisting of coastal states bordering Indian Ocean. India opposed Pakistan’s

entry under the pretext of discrimination in the trade by denying India the status of MFN (Ibrahim, personal communication, July 19, 2019).

Pakistan is locked at the center of Indian Ocean and its 95% trade is through sea via Karachi, Gwadar and Qasim Ports. It also provides shortest sea axis to Afghanistan, China and CARs. CPEC has enhanced Pakistan's visibility in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's role as connector and enabler of China's presence is of immense significance for both countries. Pak-China trade collaboration is an economic threat not only to India but to the other economic rivals of China as well. India always opposed Pakistan's role not only in the Indian Ocean but the Arabian Sea region as well and wanted to be the sole policeman in the region (Khan, personal communication, July 31, 2019). Therefore, India directly or indirectly objected to save its economic, military and geopolitical interests.

Following the footprints of Realism, India covertly made every possible effort to make its rival in the region unable to progress economically and strategically. But overtly, India initiated a peace initiative to soften its hardline image both internally as well as externally. Though India was totally against any talks with any military leader, Indian PM Vajpayee invited Musharraf to Agra in July 2001 (Ali, personal communication, July 12, 2019). Indian leaders realised that good neighbourly relations are in the favour of India. Therefore, Vajpayee decided to go with the military leader for the peace in the region. Both the sides wanted to negotiate on Kashmir issue but the rigid behaviour of Indian leaders made such initiative failed. India insisted on not mentioning Kashmir issue as the bone of contention between itself and Pakistan along with the condition to mark Kashmir's freedom struggle as cross border terrorism (Lateef, personal communication, August 01, 2019). Both these conditions were unacceptable to Pakistan.

After the strategic imbalance was balanced, the belligerency of India turned into a mild state. Vajpayee offered Pakistan "no first use pact" and expressed the desire of establishing *a relationship of friendship and cooperation* (Vajpayee renews offer of "no first use" pact, 1998, p. 12). India made efforts for dialogue with not only Pakistan but with China as well. Particularly talks were offered on Kashmir as Vajpayee, while addressing Rajya Sabha said:

*"India is ready for a dialogue with Pakistan, including Kashmir (India ready for talks on Kashmir: Vajpayee, 1998, p. 01)".*

The beginning of 2002 resumed hostility between the two rivals for which the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, in a special article of New Year's day, warned Indian people of the warsituation and asked his people to be ready for any such incident (Vajpayee asks Pakistan to shed hostile mentality, 2002). Along with this, India continued its military buildup along the LOC and the working boundary. The hope of Indo-Pak talks vanished with such hostile words and actions. India violated Lahore-Delhi Bus service agreement by terminating the service without informing Pakistan (India violating bus service accord,

says official, 2002). After terminating bus service, India exchanged heavy firing on LOC, mobilized its military massively, cut off road, rail and air links and called back the high commissioner from Pakistan. All such steps marked clearly the indication of Indian far reaching policy objective. India kept on stating that if US could use aggression against Afghanistan after 9/11, then India could do the same against militants. In short, India wanted to attack Azad Jammu and Kashmir to occupy this piece of land as well.

The ice was broken when the then Pakistan's President Pervaiz Musharraf extended the hand of friendship to Vajpayee in the 11<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit conference in Kathmandu. Though internationally Musharraf was praised for his handshake by calling his initiative another Agra but simultaneously, Indian Prime Minister's rude and acrimonious gesture was noticed by the international media (Alam, 2002). Such gestures proved that Indo-Pak relations are always in need of a third party for the peaceful resolution of their disputes. Despite peace initiative by Pakistan, India on January 7<sup>th</sup>, 2002 clearly stated that India would not go for talks until Pakistan changed its attitude on cross-border terrorism. Such statement came due to the visit of British Prime Minister Tony Blair to Pakistan on January 7<sup>th</sup>, 2002 to diffuse tension between the two neighbours. The then Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh accused Pakistan of double standard (on terrorism) vis-a-vis India and the international community (No talks until Pakistan changes attitude: India, 2002). All the hostile intentions and actions extended by India tempted Pakistan to go on the same line. Pakistan also cut off all links with India and kept the military on the borders.

Though Pakistan made every effort to bring India on the same page for peaceful dialogue but Indian hostility continued to rise. India purchased the American made weapons-locating radars, which were likely to be used against militants in Kashmir (India to buy US radars for Kashmir, 2002). Simultaneously Indian warplanes began exercises, under the code name Operation Trishul, along the Pakistan's border. Such steps hammered peace initiatives by Pakistan badly. Pakistan's President again offered India the withdrawal of troops along with the lifting of ban on Indian airlines if India was ready to do the same. He extended this offer while addressing the inaugural session of the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of SAARC information ministers in Islamabad (Alam, 2002). But predictably, India declined any such idea.

Attack on the Indian Parliament followed by many border skirmishes added to the bitterness of Indo-Pak relations. But the beginning of 2003 began the normalization of relations when Indian Prime Minister out of the blue offered talks to Pakistan (Musharraf welcomes Vajpayee's initiative, 2003). Consequently trade agreements were signed between the two neighbours as well as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were initiated as a step towards the practical implementation of peace. Though CBMs were hoped to not only initiate peace but would maintain peace between the neighbours. Nonetheless, Cold Start Doctrine revealed the essence of Indian mind.

To make Pakistan internally weak, India designed Cold Start Doctrine. The basic aim was to surprise Pakistan by giving very less time to react on India's attacks. The agenda of

Cold Start Doctrine was to seize Pakistan's territory swiftly by adopting limited war strategy without risking a nuclear conflict. Such idea got its roots from the ability of Pakistan to bulk up its defence in the time of crisis. To continue its desire of Akhand Bharath and regional hegemony, India acquired anti-Ballistic missile technology from Israel and delivery system from France. Along with this the Indo-US nuclear deal not only recognized the nuclear status of India but boosted India's economic and military capability- a step to counter China and have superior status than Pakistan in the region. Though Indian foreign policy has been consistent in its claim of Akhand Bharath irrespective of party divide. But with the rise of BJP to the national politics, the power muscles expression has been more obvious towards Pakistan. And there seems no realization that coercing a nuclear power is likely to have catastrophic ends. Such power muscles expression hurdles the way of trade and people to people contact between the two nuclear rivals. Other than this, the cost of war and conflict has reached to an alarming level. Consequently the region is not only in unrest but is affecting global peace as well.

### CONCLUSION

Starting from nuclear explosions and following the path of bilateral relations while heading towards Cold Start Doctrine, real politik in Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan remained vivid. Pakistan never had been important for India except for one reason; to undo Pakistan. May 1998 explosions of India marked the relations with more hostility and hawkish attitude of Indian leaders, as they thought of undoing Pakistan a fulfilled dream. The aim of *Hindutva* was seen to be fulfilled. But the nuclear deterrence achieved by Pakistan made the situation for the BJP leaders otherwise. The dream of Greater India was no longer a reality. The aim of the dominance of *Hindutva* in the region met its end. Such a scenario motivated India not to go harsh but affirmative towards Pakistan as the deterrence would result in loss on both the sides. Pakistan was not only accepted as a state in the international community but India also realized that its foreign policy towards Pakistan should be and must be revised. The only purpose of revising foreign policy was to bring in peaceful initiatives for the failed resolution of Kashmir issue. Though CBMs were introduced and meetings at all levels were made possible but still India never got ready for the plebiscite in Kashmir. Let alone plebiscite, India never gave room to any third party mediation which is the core demand of the issues of South Asia and particularly Indo-Pakistan disputes. The turn of events categorically revealed on India that if India is not willing for any concession regarding disputes, then Pakistan has the ability to cope with the situation. History remains the witness of such capability.

### References

- Abbas, H. (2018). *Pakistan's nuclear bomb*. Penguin Random House.  
Alam, I. (January 6, 2002). *Politics of handshake, handicap of bellicosity*. Karachi: The News.  
Alam, I. (March 8, 2002). *Musharraf offers troops withdrawal*. Karachi: The News.

- Ali, Y. (2019, July 12). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- Aslam, C®. M. (2019, July 24). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- Aziz, A. (2019, August 10). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- Bojang. (2018). The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 6(4):  
file:///C:/Users/ASUS/Downloads/Documents/the-study-of-foreign-policy-in-international-relations-2332-0761-1000337.pdf
- Cheema, Z. I. (2010). *Indian Nuclear Deterrence*. Oxford University Press.
- Connell, J. A. (1959). *A Critical Biography*. Cassell.
- Herd, G. P. (2010). International security, Great powers and world order. In G. P. Herd, *Great powers and strategic stability in the 21st century* (pp. 3-20). Routledge.
- Hussain, Z. Z. (2011, February 07). *The effect of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making*. Retrieved from E.International Relations: <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/07/the-effect-of-domestic-politics-on-foreign-policy-decision-making/>
- Ibrahim, P. (2019, July 19). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- (1998, June 07). *India fooled its public, cheated world: Chinese paper*. Karachi: The News.
- (1998, May 14). *India launches diplomatic efforts after tests*. Karachi: The News.
- (June 5, 1998). *India ready for talks on Kashmir: Vajpayee*. Karachi: The News.
- (February 19, 2002). *India to buy US radars for Kashmir*. The News.
- (January 2, 2002). *India violating bus service accord, says official*. Karachi: The News.
- Kashyap, S. C. (1990). *Jawaharlal Nehru: His life, work and legacy*. S. Chand & Company.
- Khan, I. (2019, July 31). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- Lateef, B®. M. (2019, August 01). Indian Foreign policy. (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- Malik, A. A. (2019, 07 13). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- (April 25, 2003). *Musharraf welcomes Vajpayee's initiative*. Karachi: The News.
- (January 8, 2002). *No talks until Pakistan changes attitude: India*. Karachi: The News.
- Rai, H. A. (1981). Pakistan's Relations with India. In H. A. Rai, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (pp. 304-318). Aziz Publishers.
- Shah, D. B. (2019, July 15). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)
- Subramanian, R. R. (1996). India's Nuclear weapon capabilities: Technological appraisal. In P. R. Chari, P. I. Cheema, & Iftikharuzzaman, *Nuclear non-proliferation in India and Pakistan* (pp. 21-41). Vanguard Books.
- Suharwardhi, D. H. (2019, June 28). Post Nuclear Indian Foreign Policy towards Paksitan under A.B.Vajpayee (1998-2004). (T. Nasib, Interviewer)

- (January 1, 2002). *Vajpayee asks Pakistan to shed hostile mentality*. Karachi: The News.
- (May 31, 1998). *Vajpayee renews offer of "no first use" pact*. Karachi: The News.
- Wadhva, C. D. (1998, June 27- July 3). Costs of economic sanctions. *Aftermath of Pokhran II. Economic and Political weekly*, 33(26), 1604-1607.

