

## **Sino-Indian Relations: Security and Economic Analysis of Bilateral Ties**

**Quaid Ali**

*PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science  
Hazara University Mansehra  
[quaidali.hu@gmail.com](mailto:quaidali.hu@gmail.com)*

**Tariq Anwar**

*Lecturer, Department of Political Science  
Hazara University Mansehra*

**Romana Bangash**

*Assistant Professor, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar.  
[romana.bangash@imsciences.edu.pk](mailto:romana.bangash@imsciences.edu.pk)*

**Arif Hussain**

*Assistant Professor, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan  
[arifhussain@awkum.edu.pk](mailto:arifhussain@awkum.edu.pk)*

### **Abstract**

*India and China entered into a new era after 1948. There was a brief period of cooperative relationship between them in the start. They caught up in the politics of the Cold War very soon. Normalization in their relation was seen from 1980's to 2010. However, the boundary issue remained unsettled. The China-Pakistan-India triangle would remain a source of friction between their relations. This study employed the qualitative method in which secondary sources of data are taken. This data is analysed thematically in this paper. The paper endeavors to analyze the areas which are the cause of friction in China-India relations in historical perspective.*

**Keywords:** *China, India, boundary, dispute, relations*

### **Introduction**

India gained independence on August 15, 1947 from the British rule while on October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) declared its establishment. Relations between the two countries remained friendly from 1949 to 1957. The United States of America and the Soviet Union emerged as the two superpowers after World War II. The conflict between these two great powers greatly influenced the world politics. Cold war started between the two powers after the war (Leffler, & Painter, 2005).

The Cold War spread to Asia by the early 1950s. China sided with the Soviet Union and entered the socialist camp. The relations between China and the United States remained

unfriendly. In 1948, due to Kashmir issue, there was a tussle between India and Pakistan while China was directly involved in the Korean War (Jervis, 2001). The United States had started negotiation with Pakistan for the establishment of military alliance. Under such conditions, neither India nor China was ready to open a second front. Resultantly, China was supported by India in the Korean War. Chinese representation in the United Nations was also supported by India. Indian friendship was important for break out of China's isolation in the international community and its dependence on the USSR. The Chinese government believed that India might be its partner, as socialism was a struggle against imperialism. In order to form a united front against the western block, it was essential to win over as many countries as possible.

#### **The 1954 Agreement and the 1962 Border Conflict:**

There are some areas on the Sino-Indian border which are disputed. The main areas of territorial dispute between China and India are in the Himalayas on the Sino-Indian border, particularly, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Aksai Chin. Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are occupied by India but claimed by China, while China has occupied the Aksai Chin area and it is claimed by India (Maxwell, 1999).

An agreement on trade and communication between Tibet Region of China and India was signed between the two countries in April, 1954. India waived its rights in Tibet which it had inherited from the British Empire and the sovereignty of China was recognized in Tibet under this agreement. Another highlight of the friendship was the cooperation of the two governments in 1955 at the Bandung Conference. However, this friendship was for a very short period of time. Serious disagreement had started to surface between the two countries by the late 1950s. The main issue was the unresolved border issue which led to a brief war in October 1962 (Malik, 2012).

The border between China and India can generally be divided into three sectors. Such as the eastern, middle and western sector (See Map 1.1). The major dispute is basically on the eastern and western sector. The Aksai Chin plateau lies on the western sector. It is surrounded by Xinjiang, Tibet and Ladakh (in Indian-administered Kashmir) from three sides. China claims that Aksai Chin is part of Xinjiang while India claims that it is part of Ladakh. The western sector was not demarcated at time of partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 (Maxwell, 1999).

Map 1.1  
The Sino-Indian Disputed Border Area



Source: The Economist, Feb 8th, 2012

India decided in 1953 to consider the Aksai Chin as the territory of India (Hoffman, 1990). China needs Aksai Chin for the connection of Xinjiang and Tibet. Nehru was put under severe political pressure due to these disputes. Hence policies towards Beijing were hardened by him. It further increased the mistrust between China and India (Singh, 2012).

The dispute on the eastern sector is over the area between the pre-1914 British Outer Line and the McMahon Line. The former North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of the Indian state of Assam is now called Arunachal Pradesh. Statehood was given to NEFA in 1986. The McMahon line was left undecided by the British (Maxwell, 1970). Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India expressed that for the last three decades, Chinese maps has shown some territory of NEFA as part of China therefore on 20th November, 1950 it was made as permanent boundary line by Indian government. (Lamb, 1967).

The dispute over middle sector is on various points on the border between Nepal and Indian-administered Kashmir. It means the Sino-Indian boundary clash is an inheritance of the British Raj (Liu, 1994).

#### **Tibet issue:**

Tibet holds a decisive position as far as Sino-Indian border issue is concerned. Tibet declared its independence in 1913 when the Chinese forces were expelled by the Tibet government at Lhasa after the fall of the Qing dynasty in China in 1912. However,

the newly founded Republic of China did not accept this independence. The British government tried to divide Tibet. A Tibet-Assam border was proposed by Henry McMahon, the then Foreign Secretary of British India. He wanted to move forward the British line of control without informing and inviting the representative of China (Neville, & Maxwell, 1970).

Later on, this line later became famous as the McMahon Line and in the Sino-Indian border dispute; it is a source of great controversy. The British left India in 1947, but some military posts had been already established by them at the south of the McMahon Line. When the People's Republic of China was established in October 1949 and it takeover Tibet in 1950, the Indian threat perceptions were increased (Liu, 1994).

Prior to the acquisition of Tibet by China, India and China were distant neighbors separated from each other by Himalayas Mountains and Tibet. In Mid-1950, Tibet was recognized by India as part of China. However, after Tibet was occupied by China, they became neighbors sharing a 4000 kilometer border. The frontiers were still disputed which lead to a 1962 border war and clashes in 1967 and 1987 (Malik, 2011).

The Chinese government was worried about the presence of bases of Tibetan resistance fighters along the border between India and Tibet. In 1948, it also discovered that some foreign intelligence services are also present in the border zone. Hence, China thought that India and the United States were planning to detach Tibet from China. Mistrust was created in China against the intentions of India. At several main defensive points near the border, posts were erected by China for the purpose of preventing imperialist and reactionaries from other countries so that they might not dispatch special agents and spies into Tibet (Paul, J., & Smith, 2013).

Tibetans were not happy over the harsh policies of China. Resultantly, there was a mass uprising in Tibet in 1959. The PLA aggressively suppressed the uprising. It led to the migration of about 80,000 of Tibetans as refugees to neighbouring India including the Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama. A summit meeting was held by China and India to discuss the border issue in April 1960. However, the issue remained unresolved (Liu, 1994).

It has been recognized by New Delhi that Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the China. Nowadays, the main issue revolves around the fact that the Tibetan government-in-exile and the 14th Dalai Lama have been hosted by India. Dalai Lama has been time and again accused by China that he is carrying out separatist activities from Indian territory. China made a demand from India to take strong actions for stopping anti-China political activities. The government of India claimed that it would oppose any such attempt and action which would try to split China and bring about independence of Tibet (Maxwell, 1999).

Measures have been taken by the Indian government to make sure that the Tibet issue does not affect Sino-Indian relations. India provides help for a smooth passage of the Olympic torch. A message was sent to Dalai Lama by Pranab Mukherjee, Foreign Minister of India to preach religion but to refrain from those political activities which could have negative impacts on Sino-Indian relations (The Economic Times, 2008).

**The war of 1962:**

Reviewing the continuous worsening condition on the border and the latest Indian military developments, it was decided by the leaders of China to fight a limited war against India. It was termed as 'war of self-defence counterattack' by the Chinese. The Chinese troops started massive attacks along the whole border on October 12, 1962. In both western and eastern sectors, Indian troops were overwhelmed by the better prepared Chinese troops. Nevertheless, Chinese aim was to punish India with a decisive beat and not to capture the area that had been claimed by China. On November 21, 1962, a unilateral ceasefire was declared by the Chinese troops after a significant advance. They withdrew to the point where the government of China considers the border with India should be. India was not ready to agree to Chinese point of withdrawal (Liu, 1994).

Indian army moved back quickly to the position after the war where they were deployed before the war. In fact, the status quo of the boundary line was not changed by the war. Chinese control over the Aksai Chin and Indian control over the south of McMahon Line remain unchanged. The line of cease-fire has in fact been considered as the 'de facto' boundary between them. In December 1962, a conference was convened in Colombo by the Prime Minister of Sri-Lanka, Bandaranaike, for the purpose of bringing China and India back to negotiation. Six countries attended the conference (Sri Lanka, Ghana, Egypt, Myanmar, Cambodia and Indonesia). Some proposals were put forward by the 'Colombo Conference' but there was disagreement over the implementation of the proposals. Finally, the Conference was unsuccessful to bring the two states back to negotiation (Deepak, 2005).

**The Sino-Indian Cold War:**

After 1962, the bilateral relations of China and India were frozen. Strong nationalist sentiments were raised by the war in India. On a large scale, the defeat of India was regarded as a national embarrassment. The psychological impacts of the war on India cannot be underestimated. The war of 1962 had also long-term effects on the security policies of India. India believed that its insufficient defence preparation led to the defeat of 1962 war. Hence it decided to develop its indigenous conventional military potential. The Chinese government believed that it was forced by India to fight in self-defence. The border conflict 1962 increased Chinese sense of fear and insecurity of encirclement by the superpowers. In 1960, military assistance was offered by the Soviet Union to India. It also shared its views with India that USSR understood India feelings regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute (Neville, & Maxwell, 1970).

An agreement was signed by the Soviet Union in 1962 to provide military equipments to India. Military support was also offered by the United States to India during the war. Hence, China perceived India as its enemy allied with both the Soviet Union and the United States to encircle China (Liu, 1994). As a reaction, Beijing turned towards Islamabad. Trade and air agreements were signed by Pakistan and China in 1963. A border agreement regarding Pakistan-controlled Kashmir was also signed between the

two countries. Pakistan was openly supported by China during Indo-Pak War in 1965. India was termed as aggressor by China (Deepak, 2005).

India and China not only associated themselves with the adversaries of each other and undermined each other strategically, but also provides assistance to those internal forces that were hostile to one another. The policy of rapprochement was adopted by India with Taiwan after 1962; though Taiwan's independence was never accepted by India (Deepak, 2005). New Delhi permitted Dalai Lama to establish his exiled government in North India. Tibetan independence movement was actively supported by some Indian politicians. Chinese government on its part, offered support to Mizos and Nagas, the insurgent groups in Northeast India as well as the Naxalbari movement in the northern part of West Bengal (Ranganathan & Khanna, 2000). Its first nuclear test was conducted by China in 1964 at Lop Nor. Ten years later; India also conducted a successful nuclear test at Pokhran. The war between India and Pakistan in 1965 was a litmus test of the Pak-US ties as well as the Sino-Pak relationships (Malone, & Mukherjee, 2010).

Diplomatic crisis broke out in June 1967 thus further spoiled Sino-Indian relations (Zhang 2012). On 13 June, 1967, two Indian diplomats were expelled by on the charges of espionage from Beijing. As a reaction, two Chinese diplomats were deported by India and they were deprived of their diplomatic status. The personnel of the Chinese embassy were assaulted in front of the embassy by some Indian demonstrators on June 16, 1967. Resultantly, the Chinese Red Guards in Beijing siege the Indian embassy. This event led to the encirclement of Chinese embassy in New Delhi. These diplomatic crises came to an end when the embassy of the other side was released from encirclement by two governments (Mishra, 2006).

In 1972, in the Northeast, its administrative control was enhanced by India. The NEFA became the centrally administered Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, through a constitutional amendment in 1974, Sikkim was made a State of India. Indian actions in the Sikkim and NEFA were strongly protested by China (Zhang, 2016).

### **Progress in the Sino-Indian Relations since 1976:**

Both India and China experienced a number of internal changes in the middle of the 1970s. An opportunity was provided for the new leadership of both states to re-examine their strategies towards each other (Liu, 1994). Deng Xiaoping became the new paramount leader of China, after the death of Mao. An independent foreign policy was readopted by the new leader. He gave great importance to develop good ties with all countries in the world based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, including the Soviet Union and the United States. He also laid great stress on importance of the developing countries as a force of world peace. He tried to promote South-South cooperation through a friendly Sino-Indian relationship (Zhang & Li, 2013).

In the general elections of 1977, for the first time in Indian history after independence, the Janata Party got victory and forms a non-Congress government in the

Centre. Morarji Desai became the new Prime Minister of India. A new term “beneficial bilateralism” was coined by the new government with regard to the neighbours of India. The policy of Mr. Gandhi to improve relations with China was continued by the Janata Government. Visit was paid to China by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Foreign Minister of India in February 1979. Vajpayee received satisfactory assurances from Huang Hua, his Chinese counterpart; for stopping support to Mizo and Naga insurgents in the northeast of India (Zhang & Li, 2013).

In January 1980, Mrs. Gandhi captured the reins of government. It was made quite clear by her that it was in the interest of India to improve ties with China. Thus the formal border negotiations between China and India were opened. Eight rounds of border talks in New Delhi and Beijing were held alternately from 1981 to 1987. Nevertheless, official-level rounds failed to achieve any breakthrough on the boundary question. During this period, official and unofficial visits markedly increased (Zhang & Li, 2013).

In December 1988, the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, visited China. A channel of regular high-level exchange between China and India was set up after the visit of Rajiv Gandhi. China and India agreed to decrease troops along the LAC of the Sino-Indian border region and signed two confidence-building agreements in 1993 and 1996 respectively. Bilateral exchanges in defense, trade, education, culture, information, environment and broadcasting sectors increased progressively. During 1988 to 1998, increasing institutional links were not only established at the military level but also within the journalistic, scientific and political communities (Deepak, 2005).

However, greater progress in bilateral relations and on the border issue was not easy due to a deep mistrust over a very long period of time (Mansingh, 2005). Thus, though bilateral exchanges were helpful in steady progress of the Sino-Indian relations, the events that unfolded in 1998 confirmed that a period of ten years was short to remove the deep rooted misunderstanding and mistrust between China and India (Deepak, 2005).

The year 1998 was a turning point in the political system of India. In March 1998, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which is the Hindu nationalist party came to power. It was consistently stressed by the BJP that to safeguard national security, India required nuclear weapons. Five nuclear tests conducted by India on May 11 and 13, 1998, brought international attention and concern to the South Asian region (Khalid et al. 2016).

‘Xinhua News Agency’ reported that initial response of China to the tests was restrained and it simply expressed concern over it. However, Vajpayee also wrote a letter to Clinton, the president of the United States in which he linked China’s threat in defence of nuclearization of India. The letter was published by the ‘New York Times’ on May 13, 1998. Thus beaten by Indian actions, Beijing reacted strongly and angrily to the second series of nuclear tests of May 13th and criticized Indian nuclear explosions (Deepak, 2005). Ten days before the explosions, George Fernandes, the Defence Minister of India had expressed during an interview that China was ‘potential threat number one’ (Malone, & Mukherjee, 2010). This immediately damaged the bilateral relations. “Chinese threat” in

this context was a deliberate attempt to justify Indian nuclear tests. The bilateral relations recovered rather quickly this time (Zhang, 2016).

In January 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited India with a focus on economic issues. Vajpayee assured him during a meeting that India did not consider China as a threat for India. It showed the willingness of India to cooperate with China. Furthermore, a five-point proposal on the full development of bilateral relations presented by Zhu was: to maintain high-level exchanges between the two states and exchanges in all fields, to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in trade and economy, to promote exchange and cooperation in science and technology, to push forward regional economic cooperation, and to properly handle those issues existing between the two nations (Cherion, 2002).

#### **Current Dynamics (2003-2016):**

Sino-Indian relations continue to develop and diversify in a steady manner in the 21st century after the temporary setback of 1998 due to Indian nuclear explosions. The Prime Minister of India, Vajpayee, paid a six-day official visit to China from June 22-27, 2003. The 'Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation' was signed by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Vajpayee on 23 June 2003. Although the declaration was only a framework document, it still signified how far the two countries had progressed from the mutual suspicion of 1998. In the start of the Declaration both the countries clearly stated that "the common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences," and that they would "fully utilize the substantial potential and opportunities for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation." The two sides settle for the establishment of Special Representatives' Meeting to discover a plan for a boundary settlement (Arif, 2013).

BJP lost office after the Indian general elections of 2004. Congress Party won the elections and Manmohan Singh became the head of the government. The policy line of the previous government was continued by the new party. After one year, in April 2005, Premier of China, Wen Jiabao paid a visit to India. A Joint Statement and numerous other bilateral agreements on economic, cultural and border issues were signed by the two governments. Sikkim was officially recognized by China as part of India in 2005. It also seemed that China acquiesced to Indian bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. However, this understanding was negated in mid 2008 when China subsequently refused to explicitly endorse Indian bid at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Russia, China, Brazil, and India (Malone & Mukherjee, 2010).

However, problems continue to worsen the relationship, particularly where the border is concerned. In 2007 Chinese government declined to grant a visa to an official from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China claims this region as its own territory in the eastern sector. Beijing put forward the grounds that he was a citizen of China. The official was member of a group of 107 officers who were visiting China for a study tour. The entire visit was cancelled by the Indian government in retaliation (Malone & Mukherjee, 2010).

### **Economic Relations:**

Trade and economic relationship is an important part of Sino-India bilateral relations. These ties have continuously expanded and deepened over the past twenty years. The 'Most Favored Nation Agreement' was signed between the two countries in 1984. The bilateral trade volume of India and China in the year 2000 was US\$2.92 billion, US\$ 20 billion by 2008 and in 2011 this reached US\$73.9 billion. China became the largest goods trading partner of India in 2008, replacing the US (Arif, 2013).

For India, the main challenge is to diversify its export basket to China. The trade deficit of India had risen to about US\$27 billion by 2011. The Chinese government is acknowledging Indian concerns over trade deficit and is making efforts to improve market access in China for Indian products. Furthermore, India is worried that a large quantity of cheap Chinese goods could harm domestic industry. About 149 anti-dumping cases were initiated by India against China in December 2012. It was more than 50 % of all cases filed by India against foreign countries (The Hindu, April 15, 2012).

Both India and China are net importers of crude oil. They are in quest of diversifying their energy supply through natural gas. This growing energy demand of both the countries has the potential to cast them in direct competition for hydrocarbon resources from Central Asia. The Chinese and Indian producers are already in competition in export markets for goods such as textiles, garments, leather goods and light machinery (Malone, & Mukherjee, 2010).

### **Cooperation in the field of energy:**

China and India have emerged as two super energy consumers as their economies are continuously growing. They apprehended that global energy markets and open access can be restricted and influenced by American-led efforts. In the quest for overseas energy assets Chinese companies have performed better than India. However, the rivalry between China's and Indian companies would be harmful for both, regardless of who eventually win the bid. One of such a case occurred in Angola in October 2004. India bid US\$600 million for a 50% stake in Shell's Angola oil field Block with a pledge of including US\$200 million for supporting ongoing project of Angola on railway construction. China outbid Indian bid with a US\$2 billion offer (Singh, 2012).

The two countries agreed in 2005 to cooperate in energy savings and energy security, through active group efforts in the survey and exploration of gas and oil and resources in third world countries. In December 2005, for the first time, oil companies of both the countries teamed up to purchase 37% of Petro-Canada's stake at a cost of US\$573 million in Syria. They also jointly acquired 50% of the shares of an oil field in Colombia in August 2006 (Brewster, 2014). Mani Shankar Aiyar, Petroleum Minister of India visited China in January 2006. He led an Indian natural gas delegation with him and signed five MoUs. Most of the MoUs dealt with information sharing and cooperation between companies (China Daily, January 13, 2006).

### **Military and Security Issues:**

Chinese incursions or intrusions have been occasionally highlighted by Indian media reports that agitated bilateral ties. However, the incursions were minimized by the government of India. Deepak Kapoor, the Indian Army Chief expressed that the number of such incidents had not increased as compared to the previous year (Krishna, 2009).

India has expressed special concerns over nuclear and missile-technology assistance of China to Pakistan. A nuclear arms race could be fueled on the subcontinent due to the current or future tensions between Pakistan and India (Malone, & Mukherjee, 2010).

In November 2007, the first Annual Defence Dialogue between China and India was held in Beijing. The first joint training exercise “Hand-in-Hand” on land was conducted by Indian and Chinese armies in 2007 and 2008. However, in 2010 military exchanges were suspended by India with China when China refused to grant permission to a senior Indian Army Commander on an official trip to China. The military exchanges soon resumed as the relations normalized (The Economic Times, June 20, 2012). In December 2011, in the Annual Defence Dialogue, both the countries agreed to boost defense exchanges and communications for mutual trust and better understanding (The Times of India, September 5, 2012).

By 2011, India took several steps for security in the territory along the LAC. It raised two mountain divisions of the Army and deployed four squadrons of its frontline Su-30 MKI fighters. It also activated numerous new and old airfields and constructed new roads to enable the rapid movement of troops and equipment in the region. The government is giving maximum priority towards completion of its massive road network projects along the Indo-China border region (Antony, 2011).

### **Indian Ocean Naval Presence:**

In the current years, in the context of military issues between China and India, the Indian Ocean has attained significant importance. Indian core interest in the region is to maintain stability in the Indian Ocean. India is very concerned about naval interference in the Indian Ocean. It rejects the view point that an outside power is necessary as “a sea-balancer” in the region. India opposed the entry of the US and Russia into the Indian Ocean after the British withdrawal. Currently, Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean are matter of concern for India.

Economic activities of China in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka could probably be misinterpreted by India as activities for military purposes due to historical distrust. There is a suspected “string of Pearls” strategy of China. This term was used for the first time in an internal US Department of Defense report having title “Energy Futures in Asia”. Later on, it became famous in the international geo-political discussions (The Washington Times, January 17, 2005). However, the “string of pearls” strategy has been denied by China. The doubtful string of pearls stands for a chain of Chinese commercial activities than military means of advancement in the Indian Ocean. However, based on the assumption that China is building a ‘string of pearls’ along important SLOC in the

Indian Ocean, some analysts of India began to talk of a potential “necklace of diamonds” strategy as Indian reaction. They suggest that India should strengthen its strategic cooperation with countries in the east of the Indian Ocean such as Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam.

**China-Pakistan-India triangle:**

In the Sino-Indian relations, China-Pakistan-India triangle has been one of the major issues. The friendly ties between China and Pakistan developed in a special historical context, in which adversarial relationship of China with India was one of the most significant factors. China is the closest friend and strategic ally of Pakistan. India believed that China has reached a strategic understanding with Pakistan founded on their convergent interests against India (Miller, 2007).

Besides the close military relations between China and Pakistan, economic cooperation has become another key area in their relationship over the past several years. In 2006 both the countries signed a comprehensive free trade agreement. Chinese enterprises had signed contracts with Pakistan amounting to a total of 19.87 billion dollars by the end of 2010. Chinese direct investment in Pakistan was 1.36 billion dollars in the same year, while Pakistan investment in China was 57.38 million dollars. Pakistan deems China a more reliable partner than the US. China is an “all-weather” friend for whereas the United States is a friend only in “good-weather.” China is no longer simply a regional power that has to gratify the interests of Pakistan alone but also looks its ally through the angle of its own global interests (Khokhar, 2011). China deals the relationship in a more careful manner and is unlikely to give more chances to the US in Pakistan (New York Times, October 6, 2011).

The steadfast support China for Pakistan has been a source of tensions in the Sino-Indian relations. China is increasingly taking interest in Kashmir issue. China believes that Pakistan provides it with geographic and geo-political advantages in both Central and South Asia. Numerous critical benefits are provided to China by its alliance Pakistan. First, it provides China with diplomatic support regarding Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang on the world level. Second, it is a counterweight to Indian hegemony in South Asia. Third, Pakistan will act as a gateway for China to the Muslim world and easy access to the resource-rich Central Asian nations of Central Asia. Finally, the alliance helps the long-term strategy of China to keep the United States preponderance in the region at length (Dwivedi, 2013).

**Conclusion:**

Two factors are dominant in India-China relationship. Since 1948, their relations are oscillating between competition and cooperation. Sometimes one side is stronger, and sometimes they are equal in power and influence. India and China is working together to enhance mutual trust and to maintain peace and tranquility in border region through CBMs. The security dilemma is persistent. Both seek to maintain a military balance and are carefully watching each other. In the Indian Ocean, China is currently supporting Pakistan to construct Gwader Port and would possibly be able to challenge Indian

domination. Over the past years, the relationship between India and Pakistan has undergone twists and turns. Unfortunately, once again, tensions amplified between India and Pakistan due to the instability in the Indian held Kashmir. The confrontation between India and Pakistan put China in the position to choose Pakistan between the two neighbouring states. It would serve the interest of China. Yet, traditionally, India believes that the Sino-India and India-Pakistan relationships are separate issues. Pak-China relationship is viewed by India as support for enemy of India. It still remains to be seen whether New Delhi could accept China's assistance to Pakistan and how and to what extent the relations between India and Pakistan can be improved. It is expected that a better Sino-Indian relationship could neutralize the Pakistani factor in the triangle.

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